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S/22690
11 June 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 JUNE 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring the following urgent issue to your attention.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is gravely concerned over the increasingly momentous reports of developments in southern Iraq which could seriously threaten the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the one hand and further destabilize the entire region on the other. There are credible evidence that Iraqi army is preparing for a general mopping-up operation in the south and the south-east where close to 700,000 Iraqi citizens are contained. Under such circumstances, thousands of Iraqi citizens are feared to get killed while several hundred thousands may flee into Iran.

The Islamic Republic of Iran warns the international community in general and the Security Council of the United Nations in particular that its capacity to care for Iraqi refugees are stretched to the limit and, therefore, it is absolutely unable, with or without international humanitarian assistance, to attend to the needs of another influx of Iraqi refugees. The Islamic Republic of Iran calls upon Your Excellency and the Security Council to adopt immediate measures to avert the risk of recurrence of another tragic incident for Iraqi population and the region as a whole.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

91-19185 2400f (E)

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LETTER DATED 10 JUNE 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to submit, for the purpose of registration, a list of further violations of the cease-fire by Iraqi forces. These violations had been reported to the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) at the time they had taken place. The numerical sequence of these violations follows the sequence of those previously reported and circulated as Security Council document S/22625.

3375. On 25 January 1990, at 1130 hours, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 137-751 on the map of Mehran.

3376. On 25 January 1990, at 1200 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 136-748 on the map of Mehran.

3377. On 25 January 1990, at 1200 hours, a row of 200 metre barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of ND 535-022 to 535-005 on the map of Kharatha.

3378. On 25 January 1990, at 1554 hours, a concrete firing bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 482-082 on the map of Kharatha.

3379. On 25 January 1990, at 1830 hours, Iraqi forces were observed unloading ammunition at the geographic coordinates of NC 558-951 on the map of Kharatha.

3380. On 25 January 1990, at 1830 hours, Iraqi forces reinforced their troops with the strength of 20 soldiers at the geographic coordinates of NC 558-951 on the map of Kharatha.

3381. On 25 January 1990, at 0700 hours, a cannon shell was fired by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 5625-4152 on the map of Khosro Abad.

3382. On 25 January 1990, a 200-metre-long connecting trench was dug by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of ND 487-077 to ND 489-079 on the map of Kharatha.

3383. On 26 January 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 986-858 on the map of Nosoud.

3384. On 26 January 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 979-844 on the map of Nosoud.

3385. On 26 January 1990, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 986-858 on the map of Nosoud.

3386. On 26 January 1990, a tank was deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PD 005-886 on the map of Nosoud.

3387. On 26 January 1990, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 379-795 on the map of Mavoot.

3388. On 26 January 1990, at 1300 hours, three flags were set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 140-765 on the map of Mehran.

3389. On 26 January 1990, at 1315 hours, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 484-057 on the map of Kharatha.

3390. On 26 January 1990, at 2000 hours, Iraqi forces reinforced their troops with the strength of 10 soldiers at the geographic coordinates of NC 558-951 on the map of Kharatha.

3391. On 26 January 1990, at 2050 hours, an illuminating shell was fired by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 532-953 on the map of Sizdeh.

3392. On 26 January 1990, a trench was repaired by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 986-858 on the map of Nosoud.

3393. On 26 January 1990, a bunker was repaired by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 986-858 on the map of Nosoud.

3394. On 26 January 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 979-844 on the map of Nosoud.

3395. On 26 January 1990, Iraqi troops were reinforced at the geographic coordinates of PB 137-746 on the map of Mehran.

3396. On 26 January 1990, a jamming device was deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 126-754 on the map of Mehran.

3397. On 26 January 1990, Iraqi forces reinforced their troops with the strength of a group at the geographic coordinates of PB 087-713 on the map of Mehran.

3398. On 27 January 1990, Iraqi forces were observed training 30 soldiers at the geographic coordinates of 094-618 on the map of Mehran.

3399. On 27 January 1990, Iraqi forces were observed training a company at the geographic coordinates of NB 993-685 on the map of Mehran.

3400. On 27 January 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 130-748 on the map of Mehran.

3401. On 27 January 1990, a 100-metre-long trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 487-073 on the map of Kharatha.

3402. On 27 January 1990, a firing position was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 487-073 on the map of Kharatha.

3403. On 27 January 1990, at 0920 hours, a trench was repaired and completed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 483-082 on the map of Kharatha.

3404. On 27 January 1990, at 0945 hours, an Iraqi helicopter was observed flying over the border line at the geographic coordinates of NC 67-27 to 64-27 on the map of Kani Sheikh.

3405. On 27 January 1990, at 1700 hours, a group bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 904-161 on the map of Helaleh.

3406. On 27 January 1990, several flags were set up on top of a number of bunkers by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 14-75 on the map of Mehran.

3407. On 27 January 1990, a 20-metre-long trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 75-64 on the map of Helaleh.

3408. On 27 January 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 344-909 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

3409. On 27 January 1990, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 344-909 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

3410. On 27 January 1990, at 1530 hours, an Iraqi helicopter was observed patrolling westward at 4,000 foot altitude over the border line in Ghalameh.

3411. On 28 January 1990, at 1600 hours, a group bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 143-777 on the map of Mehran.

3412. On 28 January 1990, at 0920 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 689-221 on the map of Ghalameh.

3413. On 28 January 1990, at 1000 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 693-216 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3414. On 28 January 1990, at 1055 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 47-05 on the map of Kharatha.

3415. On 28 January 1990, at 1145 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 656-233 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3416. On 28 January 1990, at 1525 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 49-07 on the map of Kharatha.

3417. On 28 January 1990, at 1530 hours, a group bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 155-771 on the map of Mehran.

3418. On 28 January 1990, an accommodation bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 573-478 on the map of Sumar.

3419. On 28 January 1990, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 115-704 on the map of Mehran.

3420. On 28 January 1990, Iraqi forces concentrated their forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 136-559 on the map of Mehran.

3421. On 28 January 1990, seven Toyota vehicles were deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 136-559 on the map of Mehran.

3422. On 29 January 1990, at 1315 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 54-98 on the map of Kharatha.

3423. On 29 January 1990, at 1640 hours, a foxhole bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 553-957 on the map of Kharatha.

3424. On 29 January 1990, a sandbag observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 744-614 on the map of Azgaleh.

3425. On 29 January 1990, Iraqi forces were seen throwing iron beams, plates and wire down the mountain at the geographic coordinates of ND 71-48 on the map of Azgaleh.

3426. On 30 January 1990, at 0830 hours, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 553-957 on the map of Kharatha.

3427. On 30 January 1990, at 1055 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 483-080 on the map of Kharatha.

3428. On 30 January 1990, at 1120 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 479-056 on the map of Kharatha.

3429. On 30 January 1990, at 1300 hours, a firing bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 479-056 on the map of Kharatha.

3430. On 30 January 1990, at 1000 hours, two Iraqi helicopters were observed patrolling over the Shindervi heights in Bakhtaran general area.

3431. On 31 January 1990, at 1700 hours, a 50-metre-long trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 484-082 on the map of Kharatha.

3432. On 31 January 1990, at 1700 hours, a 100-metre-long trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 483-086 on the map of Kharatha.

3433. On 31 January 1990, a communication antenna was installed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NF 286-043 on the map of Sardasht.

3434. On 31 January 1990, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 037-897 on the map of Saleh Abad.

3435. On 31 January 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 709-483 on the map of Azgaleh.

3436. On 31 January 1990, at 0943 hours, an Iraqi plane violated the airspace of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the geographic coordinates of NE 3200-4700 at 20,000 foot altitude and 360 nautical miles per hour. Iraqi plane penetrated 20 miles inside Iranian airspace, where it flew a distance of 60 miles. It exited the airspace of the Islamic Republic of Iran at 1030 hours at the geographic coordinates of NE 3140-3740.

3437. On 1 February 1990, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 30-86 on the map of Sardasht.

3438. On 1 February 1990, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 281-884 on the map of Sardasht.

3439. On 1 February 1990, a row of concertina barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 261-930 on the map of Sardasht.

3440. On 1 February 1990, at 0830 hours, a bunker was reconstructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 156-771 on the map of Mehran.

3441. On 1 February 1990, at 0830 hours, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 60-42 on the map of Hosseinieh.

3442. On 1 February 1990, at 1015 hours, a two-barrel anti-aircraft gun was deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 203-988 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

3443. On 1 February 1990, at 1040 hours, an accommodation bunker was reconstructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 148-776 on the map of Mehran.

3444. On 1 February 1990, at 1056 hours, some poles were installed for setting up barbed wire by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 698-217, 662-233 and 614-245 on the map of Ghalameh.

3445. On 1 February 1990, at 1215 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 891-326 on the map of Panjwain.

3446. On 1 February 1990, at 1258 hours, Iraqi forces were seen blocking and unblocking the road using a loader at the geographic coordinates of NC 544-530 on the map of Sumar.

3447. On 1 February 1990, at 1500 hours, ammunition was unloaded by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QB 145-020 on the map of Dehloran.

3448. On 1 February 1990, at 1515 hours, ammunition was unloaded by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QB 137-018 on the map of Dehloran.

3449. On 1 February 1990, at 1600 hours, three 130-millimetre guns were deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 9340-5955 on the map of Nanoor.

3450. On 1 February 1990, a plate wall was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 537-453 on the map of Sumar.

3451. On 1 February 1990, a row of 1,000-metre-long barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of ND 490-180 to ND 503-190 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3452. On 1 February 1990, a communication antenna was installed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QB 196-015 on the map of Dehloran.

3453. On 2 February 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QB 216-017 on the map of Dehloran.

3454. On 2 February 1990, a two-barrel gun was deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 207-988 on the map of Dehloran.

3455. On 2 February 1990, a two-barrel gun was deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 203-992 on the map of Dehloran.

3456. On 2 February 1990, a missile-launching pad was deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 215-985 on the map of Dehloran.

3457. On 2 February 1990, a missile-launching pad was deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 217-986 on the map of Dehloran.

3458. On 2 February 1990, at 1000 hours, two bunkers were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 132-801 on the map of Mehran.

3459. On 2 February 1990, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of ND 486-116 to ND 487-130 on the map of Kharatha.

3460. On 2 February 1990, poles were installed for setting up barbed wire by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of ND 486-116 to ND 487-130 on the map of Kharatha.

3461. On 3 February 1990, at 1030 hours, an Iraqi helicopter was patrolling at the geographic coordinates of NC 610-270 on the map of Kani Sheikh.

3462. On 3 February 1990, at 1319 hours, a road was improved by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 554-819 on the map of Sizdeh.

3463. On 3 February 1990, at 1600 hours, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 539-851 on the map of Sizdeh.

3464. On 3 February 1990, at 1600 hours, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 540-856 on the map of Sizdeh.

3465. On 3 February 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 092-688 on the map of Mehran.

3466. On 3 February 1990, at 1740 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 489-056 on the map of Kharatha.

3467. On 3 February 1990, poles were installed for setting up barbed wire by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 531-008 on the map of Kharatha.

3468. On 4 February 1990, at 1015 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 08-67 on the map of Mehran.

3469. On 4 February 1990, at 1040 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 09-68 on the map of Mehran.

3470. On 4 February 1990, at 1545 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 893-145 on the map of Helaleh.

3471. On 4 February 1990, a row of 100-metre-long barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 530-001 on the map of Kharatha.

3472. On 4 February 1990, Iraqi forces reinforced their troops with the strength of a company at the geographic coordinates of ND 697-209 on the map of Ghalameh.

3473. On 4 February 1990, Iraqi forces reinforced their troops with the strength of a company at the geographic coordinates of ND 615 747 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3474. On 4 February 1990, at 1540 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 308-893 on the map of Sardasht.

3475. On 4 February 1990, at 1020 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QB 216-017 on the map of Dehloran.

3476. On 4 February 1990, at 1020 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QB 145-012 on the map of Dehloran.

3477. On 4 February 1990, an unidentified object (probably an artillery piece) was deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 217-986 and QA 215-985 on the map of Dehloran.

3478. On 5 February 1990, at 1500 hours, a tank was deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 997-539 on the map of Marivan.

3479. On 5 February 1990, a sandbag bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 800-642 on the map of Azgaleh.

3480. On 5 February 1990, a row of 200-metre-long barbed wire was installed by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of ND 580-232 to ND 600-235 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3481. On 5 February 1990, a row of 2-metre-high wire gauze was installed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 539-997 on the map of Kharatha.

3482. On 5 February 1990, at 0130 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 88100-38100 on the map of Panjwain.

3483. On 5 February 1990, at 1500 hours, a tank was deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 98250-52300 on the map of Marivan.

3484. On 6 February 1990, at 1000 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 374-815 on the map of Mavoot.

3485. On 6 February 1990, at 0845 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 550-956 on the map of Kharatha.

3486. On 6 February 1990, at 1430 hours, ammunition was unloaded by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 975-004 on the map of Saleh Abad.

3487. On 6 February 1990, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 693-215 on the map of Ghalameh.

3488. On 6 February 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 695-220 on the map of Ghalameh.

3489. On 6 February 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 522-013 on the map of Kharatha.

3490. On 6 February 1990, Iraqi troops were deployed at the geographic coordinates of PB 02-97 on the map of Saleh Abad.

3491. On 6 February 1990, Iraqi troops were deployed at the geographic coordinates of NB 985-985 on the map of Saleh Abad.

3492. On 6 February 1990, Iraqi troops were deployed at the geographic coordinates of PB 012-970 on the map of Saleh Abad.

3493. On 6 February 1990, Iraqi troops were deployed at the geographic coordinates of PB 012-985 on the map of Saleh Abad.

3494. On 6 February 1990, at 1510 hours, two individual bunkers were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QB 143-012 on the map of Dehloran.

3495. On 6 February 1990, at 1741 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 42-79 on the map of Ein-Kosh.

3496. On 6 February 1990, at 0900 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TQ 15-33 on the map of Hosseinieh.

3497. On 7 February 1990, at 1120 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 22-88 on the map of Sardasht.

3498. On 7 February 1990, at 0700 hours, a defensive position was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 095-682 on the map of Mehran.

3499. On 7 February 1990, at 0850 hours, a firing position was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 685-221 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3500. On 7 February 1990, at 1050 hours, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 682-251 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3501. On 7 February 1990, at 1110 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 691-222 on the map of Ghalameh.

3502. On 7 February 1990, at 1210 hours, a telephone line was installed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 694-215 on the map of Ghalameh.

3503. On 7 February 1990, at 1500 hours, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NB 995-991 on the map of Saleh Abad.

3504. On 7 February 1990, a resting bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 384-815 on the map of Mavoot.

3505. On 7 February 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PE 011-068 on the map of Ney.

3506. On 7 February 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PE 012-065 on the map of Ney.

3507. On 7 February 1990, Iraqi forces advanced towards Iranian troops at the geographic coordinates of PE 012-065 on the map of Ney.

3508. On 7 February 1990, Iraqi forces advanced towards Iranian troops at the geographic coordinates of PE 011-068 on the map of Ney.

3509. On 7 February 1990, at 0700 hours, a defensive bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 095-682 on the map of Mehran.

3510. On 7 February 1990, at 0800 hours, two observation posts were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 538-831 on the map of Sizdeh.

3511. On 7 February 1990, at 0850 hours, a firing position was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 685-221 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3512. On 7 February 1990, at 1040 hours, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 695-220 on the map of Ghalameh.

3513. On 7 February 1990, at 1050 hours, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 682-251 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3514. On 7 February 1990, at 1110 hours, a resting bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 691-222 on the map of Ghalameh.

3515. On 7 February 1990, at 1210 hours, a telephone line was installed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 694-215 on the map of Ghalameh.

3516. On 7 February 1990, at 1500 hours, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NB 995-991 on the map of Saleh Abad.

3517. On 7 February 1990, at 1600 hours, a group bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 143-777 on the map of Mehran.

3518. On 7 February 1990, at 1600 hours, three 130-millimetre guns were deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 9340-5955 on the map of Nanoor.

3519. On 8 February 1990, at 1345 hours, a rocket launcher was deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 288-874 on the map of Sardasht.

3520. On 8 February 1990, at 1300 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 91-18 on the map of Ney.

3521. On 8 February 1990, at 1600 hours, a guarding post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 89600-32800 on the map of Panjwain.

3522. On 8 February 1990, at 2350 hours, the movements of two Iraqi armoured personnel carriers were observed at the geographic coordinates of ND 615-244 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin. They were stationed at the geographic coordinates of ND 624-246 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3523. On 8 February 1990, a guarding post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 61-47 on the map of Chananeh.

3524. On 9 February 1990, at 0940 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QB 155-015 on the map of Dehloran.

3525. On 9 February 1990, at 1200 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 71-21 on the map of Chazabeh.

3526. On 9 February 1990, at 0845 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 697-217 on the map of Ghalameh.

3527. On 9 February 1990, at 1153 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 655-219 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3528. On 9 February 1990, at 0900 hours, a group bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 918-192 on the map of Ney.

3529. On 9 February 1990, between 0900-1300 hours, a group bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 918-093 on the map of Ney.

3530. On 9 February 1990, at 1130 hours, two cannons were deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 902-435 on the map of Panjwain.

3531. On 9 February 1990, at 1130 hours, two cannons were moved by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of NE 9115-3515 to NE 9125-4210 on the map of Panjwain.

3532. On 9 February 1990, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PD 056-899 on the map of Nosoud.

3533. On 9 February 1990, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QB 235-008 on the map of Dehloran.

3534. On 9 February 1990, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QB 155-015 on the map of Dehloran.

3535. On 9 February 1990, at 2100 hours, three flags were set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 1770-8155 on the map of Nim Istgah Navad.

3536. On 9 February 1990, six flags were set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 1770-8155 on the map of Nim Istgah Navad.

3537. On 9 February 1990, one flag was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 17875-80800 on the map of Nim Istgah Navad.

3538. On 9 February 1990, a firing position was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 17875-80800 on the map of Nim Istgah Navad.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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12 June 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission

1. This is a further progress report on the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM); it follows my report of 9 May 1991 (S/22580).

Organizational aspects

2. Following the arrival of seven observers each from Senegal and Turkey, UNIKOM now has its full complement of military observers, as follows:

Argentina	7	Nigeria	7
Austria	7	Norway	8
Bangladesh	7	Pakistan	9
Canada	1	Poland	7
China	20	Romania	7
Denmark	7	Senegal	7
Fiji	7	Singapore	7
Finland	7	Sweden	7
France	20	Thailand	7
Ghana	8	Turkey	7
Greece	7	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	20
Hungary	7	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	20
India	8	United States of America	20
Indonesia	7	Uruguay	8
Ireland	8	Venezuela	7
Italy	7	Total	299
Kenya	8		
Malaysia	8		

3. Administrative and logistic support is provided by the following units:

Engineers (Canada)	293
Logistics (Sweden)	31
Movement control/postal (Denmark)	23
Helicopters (Chile)	50
Medical (Norway)	50
Total	447

Two fixed-wing aircraft from Switzerland are operated by civilians. In addition, UNIKOM has had the use of chartered aircraft for the movement of troops and equipment and for communications between Baghdad and Kuwait. The Government of Sweden provided free airlift at the beginning of the Mission.

4. Two infantry companies (Fijian, Nepalese) and one logistic company (Swedish) temporarily assigned from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and one infantry company (Danish) from the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) have returned to their parent missions. Two infantry companies, one from UNFICYP (Austrian) and one from UNIFIL (Ghanaian), remain with UNIKOM; their combined strength is 217 all ranks. As a result, the overall strength of the Mission has been reduced to 963 all ranks.

5. Logistic support for the Mission is still difficult, given the lack of normal infrastructure in the area. However, thanks to assistance from the United States Army and forces of other Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, UNIKOM is now able to meet its requirements as regards rations, vehicles and accommodation. Conditions in the field, however, remain austere, with all personnel living under canvas and subsisting largely on field rations. The situation is expected to improve gradually, with the provision of fresh rations and prefabricated accommodation.

6. UNIKOM headquarters has remained in a hotel annex south of Kuwait City, which was made available by the Government of Kuwait. By 15 June, the headquarters will be moved, as an interim measure, to the logistic base at Doha, pending completion of the necessary refurbishment of the premises at Umm Qasr, which still lack basic facilities such as electricity, water and sewerage.

7. UNIKOM has maintained contact with and provided logistic support to other United Nations missions working in Iraq and Kuwait.

Demilitarized zone

8. The situation in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) has been calm. It is sparsely populated; the main population centres are the towns of Umm Qasr and Safwan, both on the Iraqi side. South of Safwan, on Kuwaiti territory, some 5,000 displaced persons still live in the Abdali camp. They are being

assisted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the League of Red Cross Societies. The camp is guarded by Kuwaiti police.

9. The Governments of Iraq and Kuwait, which are responsible for civil administration on their respective sides of the DMZ, have deployed border police to maintain law and order. Iraq currently has some 250 police in the DMZ. Kuwait is in the process of restoring its police presence and plans to rebuild and man some 30 police stations along the border. Both Governments have agreed to limit the armament of their police to sidearms.

10. Much of the DMZ is littered with unexploded ordnance and mines, particularly in the south. UNIKOM maintains maps delineating cleared routes; only on these routes is movement authorized.

Deployment and concept of operations

11. For operational purposes, UNIKOM has divided the DMZ into three sectors. Each sector has a headquarters and six observation posts, of which one in the southern sector has not yet been established. The Austrian security company has platoons in the central and northern sectors and at Umm Qasr; the Ghanaian security company has platoons in the southern sector, the Doha Logistic Base and at the temporary UNIKOM headquarters. The deployment of UNIKOM is shown on the attached map.

12. In addition to its fixed observation posts, UNIKOM deploys temporary observation points, mobile patrols (on land and in the air) and investigation teams. The temporary observation points are established from the fixed observation posts, either in areas of particular activity or where roads and tracks enter the DMZ. They are augmented by mobile ground patrols and by aerial reconnaissance. The latter is the only means of maintaining adequate observation of the Khor Abdullah waterway and the southern sector of the DMZ, where mines and unexploded ordnance severely limit UNIKOM's ability to carry out ground patrols. The security companies serve as a quick reaction force and maintain a high state of readiness in order to provide protection to the military observers.

13. UNIKOM maintains close liaison with the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait. Both have given the Mission all the support and cooperation necessary for it to carry out its mandate.

Violations and complaints

14. Since the DMZ was established on 9 May, there have been a number of instances in which personnel of the armed forces of both Iraq and Kuwait and personnel of the Saudi Arabian forces stationed in Kuwait were observed in the DMZ. These observations have been brought to the attention of the parties concerned, which have explained that the majority were due to errors of navigation or misunderstandings over the boundaries of the DMZ. UNIKOM has

posted signs on all major access roads and tracks leading into the DMZ and it is hoped that this will help to prevent future incursions.

15. UNIKOM has also observed a number of overflights of the DMZ by military aircraft. Most of them have been by F-15 and F-16 type aircraft flying along the Iraq-Kuwait border. UNIKOM has brought these overflights to the attention of the Government of Kuwait.

16. Since 9 May, UNIKOM has received two complaints from the Kuwaiti authorities and three from the Iraqi authorities. The complaints of Kuwait arose from reports of Iraqi policemen carrying rifles in the DMZ and of the massing of Iraqi military formations south of Basra. After investigation by UNIKOM both were considered unfounded. Of the Iraqi complaints, one concerned an air violation that could not be substantiated. Another concerned the alleged establishment of a Kuwaiti military checkpoint within the DMZ south of Safwan; this was in fact a police post. The last complaint was that weapons were being kept at the Abdali camp and flags were being flown in a provocative manner. This complaint has been brought to the attention of the Kuwaiti authorities for appropriate action.

Infantry companies

17. The task of the infantry companies temporarily assigned from UNIFIL and UNFICYP was to provide essential security for UNIKOM during the setting-up phase, in view of the uncertainties at that time and the potential risks that might arise (see S/22454, paras. 10 and 13). After 30 days in the Mission, these companies were reduced from 5 to 2. Major General Greindl, the Chief Military Observer, has now recommended that 1 company of some 150 all ranks continue to be assigned to provide security for the Mission; 1 platoon would be deployed to each of the 3 sectors, and 1 at the headquarters in Umm Qasr. This company would also provide the basis for expansion should this be required for security reasons. General Greindl has based his recommendation on his assessment that the area is still in transition and there remains, for the time being, a risk to UNIKOM personnel.

18. I have weighed the above recommendation most carefully. In addition to General Greindl's military assessment, I have taken into consideration the excellent cooperation received from all concerned in the area and the fact that the perceived threats to the security of UNIKOM personnel during the setting-up phase did not in practice materialize. I have also borne in mind the financial implications and the growing financial burden on Member States as a result of the expansion of peace-keeping activities. In the light of these considerations, I have decided not to recommend, in the present circumstances, that UNIKOM be provided with an infantry element on a permanent basis. I intend, however, to explore with Member States the possibilities of rapid reinforcement of UNIKOM in case of emergency. I will monitor developments carefully and revert to the Security Council on this matter, should it become necessary.

Observations

19. As will be apparent from the above report, UNIKOM is now established and fully able to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the Security Council. It only remains for it to occupy its headquarters at Umm Qasr, which will be done as soon as possible. The mission area has now entered the season of great heat and this will be a testing period for UNIKOM's personnel and equipment. In the light of its experience during the remaining months of the current mandate period, I will, in October, undertake a further review of its strength and make appropriate recommendations to the Security Council. Meanwhile I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the determination and professionalism which General Greindl and all under his command have shown in setting up UNIKOM in difficult circumstances.


IRAQ
KUWAIT
SAUDI ARABIA
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
CENTRAL SECTOR
NORTHERN SECTOR
SOUTHERN SECTOR
HQ UNIKOM
HQ NORMED
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
N1
N2
N3
N4
N5
N6
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
Az Zubayr
Khorramshahr
Abadan
Umm Qasr
Shatt Al Arab
Al Faw
Jazirat Bubiyan
Jazirat Mashkan
Jazirat Faylakah
Az Zawr
Kuwait
Hawalli
Al Jahrah
Ad Dawhah
Jazirat Awhah
PERSIAN GULF
Al Fintas
Al Ahmadi
As Sabahiyah
Al Fuhayhil
Mina' al Ahmadi
Mina' 'Abd Allah
Al 'Abdaliyah
Jazirat Kubbar
Aş Şubayhiyah
Mina Su'ud
Al Khiran
Al Wafrah
Makhfar an Nuwayib
Ra's al Khafji
Markaz Hudud as Salmi
Markaz al Matla'
Jazirat Umm an Nami
Jazirat Wasbah
Jazirat Maskan
وزع بعثة الامم المتحدة للمراقبة في العراق والكويت في ايار/مايو ١٩٩١
1991年5月伊科观察团的部署情况
UNIKOM DEPLOYMENT AS OF MAY 1991
DEPLOIEMENT DE LA MONUIK, MAI 1991
РАЗВЕРТЫВАНИЕ ИКМН ООН В МАЕ 1991 ГОДА
POSICIONES DE LA UNIKOM EN MAYO DE 1991
مخفر مراقبة
观察站
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пост
Puesto de observación
مخفر مراقبة مقترح
地区分界线
Projected observation post
Poste d'observation prévu
Планируемый наблюдательный пост
Puesto de observación previsto
حدود القطاع
地区分界线
Sector boundary
Limite de secteur
Граница сектора
Limite de sector
منطقة منزوعة السلاح
非军事区
Demilitarized zone
Zone démilitarisée
Демилитаризованная зона
Zona desmilitarizada
0 10 20 30 40 km
0 10 20 mi
MAP NO. 3637 UNITED NATIONS
JUNE 1991
The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22693
12 June 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 11 JUNE 1991 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED RESPECTIVELY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the interview given recently by United States General Norman Schwarzkopf, which constitutes a confession setting forth the true purposes and objectives of the aggression, particularly on the part of the United States of America, which led the so-called "coalition" against Iraq. Even though this confession does not give all the revealed facts, it confirms the fact that the objective was to smash Israel's enemies and that the question of Kuwait was only a cover for intentions long antecedent to 2 August 1990.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir K. K. AL-NIMA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Controversial interview with United States General Norman Schwarzkopf in which he reveals major secrets relating to the Gulf war

United States General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of the military Coalition forces against Iraq in the Gulf war, recently left Saudi Arabia for his own country, the United States. In this interview with a correspondent of Israeli Army Radio in Washington, General Schwarzkopf reveals some important secrets relating to the Gulf war and the Arab armies that participated in this war against Iraq. The text of the interview follows:

Question: General Norman Schwarzkopf, we thank you and congratulate you on the occasion of the great military victory you were able to achieve in the Gulf war.

Answer: It is I who thank you for your splendid stand in this war. This stand was a great help to us in the action we carried out against Saddam Hussein.

Question: But Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi President, was able to escape from your grasp. Were there serious and genuine intentions on your part to get the man, Saddam Hussein?

Answer: Yes. I was personally very concerned with eliminating not only Saddam Hussein's military machinery but eliminating Saddam Hussein himself. I indicated this in my daily notes that I diligently wrote during the days of the war. We had firm military plans to destroy the Iraqi military force present in Kuwait completely and then to advance into Iraq. According to our military plans, our forces were to arrive at the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, and oust Saddam Hussein from there. But this did not happen, and sometimes a feeling of regret and annoyance comes over me because the operation was not properly completed as planned from the outset.

Question: The air attack carried out by the aircraft of the military coalition against the Iraqis lasted for a long time, and it would have been possible for it to last several weeks longer. Was it necessary or was it not possible to launch the land war a few days after the air attacks? Do you believe that the successive air attacks lengthened the duration of the war?

Answer: We urgently needed such successive air attacks in order to strike at and destroy the Iraqi military structure. I believe that we would have come up against difficulties if we had proceeded to launch the land attacks without dense air cover. I personally am the one who took the decision regarding the commencement of the land attacks at a time when those in Washington wanted to continue the air attacks against the Iraqis for another month.

Question: The land war against the Iraqis lasted nearly (unclear) hours. Did you expect the land war to end so quickly or were you surprised by the results obtained in the field?

Answer: To be frank, I did not expect the land war to end in our favour as quickly as it did. There were even many commanders who were pessimistic, particularly on the eve of the battle of Khafji on the Saudi Arabian/Kuwaiti border. These commanders, or some of them, believed that the land war would last a long time, for example, for several weeks. On the morning of the battle of Khafji, one of the commanders - I will not give his name - came to me and said: "I believe, Sir, that we are in a jam and that the best thing would be to call in more American troops and strengthen our attack capabilities". I listened to this commander with anger and tried to explain to him that matters were in our hands and that we had full control of the situation.

Question: Were there any Arab forces participating in the fighting against the Iraqis, and will you tell us about that?

Answer: There were military forces from more than one Arab State, but they did not all actually participate in the fighting. I believe that the Egyptian combatants were the best of the Arab combatants who participated in the fighting against the Iraqis. What else would you like to know?

Question: You say that the Egyptian soldiers were the best of the Arab soldiers participating in the fighting against the Iraqis. Will you tell us, Sir, about the other soldiers?

Answer: All right. There was a Syrian military force, and we may say that the performance of its members was poor; they did not have adequate fighting experience. I believe that one of the Syrian military units participated, side by side with the Egyptian units, in opening up paths in the minefields laid by the Iraqis in Kuwait; through these paths some of the attacking forces were able to advance. As for the Saudis, they had no major role in the liberation of Kuwait. Although some Saudi tank battalions entered Kuwait, they were always in the rear, and some of the Saudi and Kuwaiti units that were in the forward lines held up our advance and we asked the commanders of these units to go back to the rear so that our men could perform properly. I want to say here that the performance of the Saudi and Kuwaiti soldiers was much worse than that of the Syrians. There were other Arab forces which did not take part in the fighting. The members of these forces abstained from firing a single shot against the Iraqis.

Question: Did the Egyptian military force have an offensive role inside Kuwait?

Answer: Yes, I believe so. They even managed to capture many Iraqi troops.

Question: How many members of the Arab forces, in your estimation, were killed by Iraqi fire?

Answer: Not a great many. But they had many wounded and many prisoners who fell into Iraqi hands. A few days before the beginning of the ground war a number of artillery shells fired by the Iraqis fell on a forward military position of the Egyptian military force killing or wounding more than 30 Egyptian officers and men, and the dead included a senior Egyptian officer ... a major or a colonel, I do not remember exactly.

Question: With regard to the list of non-conventional weapons recently declared by Iraq, do you believe that the list is genuine and that the Iraqis have told the truth and not concealed anything?

Answer: I imagine that these people have lied to us, since we have in our possession a large quantity of advanced non-conventional weaponry and equipment. Saddam Hussein assiduously built up an enormous military force over many years and established military and chemical installations and plants in various parts of Iraq. From the outset, this man was planning to engage in widescale military operations against his neighbours, not only to occupy the State of Kuwait. Saddam had the intention of extending his occupation to other countries in the region, and I am almost completely certain that he had decided to occupy Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other countries.

Question: Do you believe, General, that the Iraqi President expected the painful and grievous consequences that the war he instigated would have?

Answer: I don't think he realized that. If Saddam Hussein had understood the consequences he would have begun to withdraw from Kuwait the week after his forces occupied it. It should be remembered that the United States Administration made very intensive efforts to persuade and urge Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait and that none of those efforts were successful because of the intransigence of the Iraqi President, who believed that his forces could withstand the forces of the military coalition or, at least, prolong the war in the same way as the war in Viet Nam.

Question: Saddam Hussein tried to draw Israel into this war and almost succeeded in doing so. Would Israel's direct involvement in the war have damaged the interests of the United States?

Answer: Israel's direct participation in the Gulf war might have caused great harm to United States interests and objectives in the region. There can be no doubt that the Arab States which joined the coalition against Saddam Hussein, including Egypt, would have withdrawn, because it is unthinkable for an Arab army to participate in a war against another Arab army alongside the army of Israel. We [the Americans], when we requested Israel to refrain from intervening directly in the war, meant exactly what we said, even when your cities [the cities of Israel] were subjected to missile bombardment by Saddam Hussein's forces. The Saudis requested us on numerous occasions, as did other Arabs, to bring pressure to bear on Israel to prevent it from

intervening directly in the war. I believe that we did that, and we appreciate the position that Israel adopted and adhered to throughout the war.

Question: Israel could have provided practical and substantial assistance to the forces of the military coalition without going so far as to send military forces from the Israeli army, flying the Israeli flag, to the Gulf region. Israel is a friend and ally of the United States, and there has been joint military and security cooperation between the two countries for many years. You must know that full well.

Answer: Israel provided us with very valuable and important assistance in our war against Saddam Hussein. I do not want to reveal controversial details, but I should say that Israel provided us with much more than we asked from it. I, personally, am very satisfied with the ongoing joint cooperation between Washington and Tel Aviv, and I intend to visit Israel soon.

Question: Will this be your first visit to Israel?

Answer: By no means. I have visited Israel many times and I have many good friends in Israel: the Minister of Defence, Moshe Arens; the Director-General of the Ministry and former commander of the Israel Air Force, David Ivri; General Uri Simhoni, a former Israeli military attaché in Washington; General Yaron Ben-Amotz, another former military attaché in Washington; Ehud Barak, the Chief of General Staff of the Israeli Army; and Minister Sharon and others. I like to visit your country [Israel] and I intend to do so soon.

Question: Do you intend to leave the military and devote yourself to political activity?

Answer: Yes. I will do so soon, and I consider myself to be a friend of Israel and one of its constant supporters.

Question: Is there something that you would like to say to the Israelis, General?

Answer: I should like to say to them all that the United States is a country that is friendly towards you, that you can trust it and rely on it, and that it will not abandon you. America does not abandon its friends. The war fought by our men in the Gulf region against Saddam Hussein was for you, for Israel, and the men endeavoured to destroy your enemy, your [Israel's] major enemy in the region.

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/22694
12 June 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 11 JUNE 1991 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that American aircraft continue to violate Iraqi airspace, as follows:

1. On 9/10 June 1991, American air activity inside Iraqi airspace amounted to 20 sorties flown by 10 two-aircraft formations, at speeds ranging from 720 to 900 km/h and at low and medium altitudes.

2. Air activity centred over the areas of Mosul, Arbil and Dohuk, the purpose being observation and provocation.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir K. K. AL-NIMA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

91-19349 2503j (E)

UNITED
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Security Council

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12 June 1991
ENGLISH
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LETTER DATED 11 JUNE 1991 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, and further to our previous correspondence, the latest being letter No. 153 of 10 June 1991, I have the honour to inform you of further instances of Iranian violations of the cease-fire between Iraq and Iran, as follows:

1. At 0830 hours on 7 June 1991, five Iranian-side personnel were observed establishing a new position at coordinates 565235, on the international boundary in the central sector (map of Qasr-e-Shirin). At 0900 hours on the same day, seven Iranian-side personnel were observed building a cabin at coordinates 361729, opposite the Bajaliyah control post, on the international boundary in the southern sector.

2. At 1000 hours on 8 June 1991, an Iranian excavator vehicle was observed building a 100-metre-long and 1-metre-high earth embankment. It was accompanied by a khaki-coloured Santana vehicle carrying two men in military uniform, one of whom bore a GC rifle. This activity was observed at geographical coordinates 298817, inside the southern-sector separation zone (map of Tayyib).

3. At 0300 hours on 9 June 1991, groups proceeding from the Iranian side engaged Iraqi units towards Uqdat Ujayrdah at coordinates 4964 in the southern sector and pressed on to the south and west in boats and punts, supported by artillery and mortar fire from the Iranian shore. At 0700 hours on the same day, three Iranian-side personnel were observed digging a position at coordinates 5723, opposite the Tuwayriq control post in the central-sector separation zone. At 1040 hours that day, an Iranian grader vehicle was observed proceeding from the Iranian rear to coordinates 497515. It repaired an old earth embankment inside the southern sector of Iraqi territory and after 45 minutes returned to the Iranian rear. At 0715 hours on the same day, 13 Iranian-side personnel were observed dismantling positions and collecting sheets of corrugated iron at coordinates 5523, opposite the Yathrib control post in the central-sector separation zone.

These repeated breaches and violations by Iran of the provisions of the cease-fire between the two countries are further incontrovertible evidence of the Iranian Government's obstinacy and of its determination deliberately to encroach on Iraq's sovereignty and security. My Government holds the Iranian Government fully responsible for all damage caused to Iraq by those actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir K. K. AL-NIMA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/22696
12 June 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 12 JUNE 1991 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that American aircraft continue to violate Iraqi airspace, as follows:

1. On 10/11 June 1991, American air activity inside Iraqi airspace amounted to four sorties flown by two formations, at a speed of 720 km/h and at medium altitude.

2. Air activity centred over the area to the north of Arbil, for the purpose of observation and provocation.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir K. K. AL-NIMA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

91-19355 2403f (E)

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22697
14 June 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Austria, Belgium and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 establishing the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for an initial period of three months,

Also recalling its subsequent resolutions extending the mandate of UNFICYP, most recently its resolution 697 (1991) of 14 June 1991,

Also recalling the report of the United Nations Secretariat Review Team of 7 December 1990 and the recommendations contained therein (S/21982),

Further recalling its resolution 682 (1990) of 21 December 1990, by which it decided to examine the problem of the costs and financing of UNFICYP in all its aspects, with a view to putting into effect an alternative method of financing simultaneously with the renewal of the mandate on or before 15 June 1991,

Taking note with appreciation of the recent consultations among Council members on the problem of the costs and financing of UNFICYP in all its aspects resulting in the report of the Group of Friends of the President of the Security Council of 31 May 1991,

Also taking note with concern of the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/22665 and Add.1 and 2) which once again draws attention to the chronic financing problem of UNFICYP,

Reaffirming again the statement of the President of the Security Council of 30 May 1990 (S/21323) in which the members emphasized that United Nations peace-keeping operations must be launched and maintained on a sound and secure financial basis,

Stressing the importance of an early agreement on a resolution of the Cyprus problem,

1. Concludes that a method of financing of UNFICYP is needed which will put the Force on a sound and secure financial basis;

2. Further concludes that the question of the costs of UNFICYP needs to be studied further, with the aim of both reducing and clearly defining the costs for which the United Nations should be responsible;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to hold consultations with members of the Council, troop contributing countries and others concerned, on the question of costs, taking into account both the report of the United Nations Secretariat Review Team of 7 December 1990 and the report of the Group of Friends of the President of the Security Council of 31 May 1991, and to report to the Council by 1 October 1991 and undertakes to decide, in the light of this report and by the time of the next extension of UNFICYP's mandate on or before 15 December 1991, on measures to be taken to put the Force onto a sound and secure financial basis.

UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/22698
12 June 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Belgium, France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990 and 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991,

Taking note of the Secretary-General's report of 2 June 1991 (S/22660) submitted pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 687 (1991),

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report of 2 June 1991 (S/22660);

2. Approves the Guidelines to Facilitate Full International Implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), annexed to the report of the Secretary-General (S/22660);

3. Reiterates its call upon all States and international organizations to act in a manner consistent with the Guidelines;

4. Requests all States, in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Guidelines, to report to the Secretary-General within 45 days on the measures they have instituted for meeting the obligations set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991);

5. Entrusts the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait with the responsibility, under the Guidelines, for monitoring the prohibitions against the sale or supply of arms to Iraq and related sanctions established in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991);

6. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to review the Guidelines at the same time as it reviews paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 of resolution 687 (1991) as set out in paragraph 28 thereof.

91-19962 3478Z (E)

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/22699
12 June 1991
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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 12 JUNE 1991 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, circulated in document S/22690, and to inform you that the allegations contained in that letter are entirely without foundation.

Iran's allegations are in fact a reiteration of the discredited position which it has adopted and pursued since it came to power in 1979. This position is based on its presenting itself as the guardian of the people of Iraq and on interference in Iraq's internal affairs without the least right and in the absence of either legal or moral justification.

This approach on the part of the Iranian regime incontrovertibly reveals Iran's regional expansionist ambitions in Iraq. Furthermore, the Iranian appeal for humanitarian assistance contained in the letter is no more than a transparent cloak which fails to conceal the invalidity and falsehood of its assertions: these in reality represent a deliberate policy of undermining the security and territorial integrity of Iraq. As is well known, it was this deliberate policy which led to the launching of the war of aggression against Iraq on 4 September 1980, a war which lasted for eight years, claimed thousands of victims among the nationals of both countries and caused immense material damage. It is the same policy which the Iranian Government pursued by sending groups of terrorists who infiltrated into Iraqi cities in the governorates of Basra, Maysan, Diyala, Wasit, Dhi Qar and Sulaymaniyah and carried out acts of destruction, murder and rape against Iraqi nationals. This policy has been revealed for all to see, and we have firm evidence to prove it. We also have a number of persons who were captured: they offer the best evidence of Iran's intervention in our internal affairs and persistent ambitions, in particular through the so-called export of the revolution and other policies which have been exposed and no longer deceive anyone.

The Government of my country both warns against intervention in its internal affairs and affirms that the security and safety of all sectors and

categories of its population are the duty and responsibility of the Iraqi authorities concerned. Southern Iraq has been secure and stable ever since an end was put to the sedition, sabotage, looting, destruction and rape which occurred there as a result of criminal acts perpetrated by Iranian infiltrators and those of their supporters who infiltrated with them, with the assistance and blessing of the Iranian Government.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir K. K. AL-NIMA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22700
14 June 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 31 May 1991, 1/

Taking note also of the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1991,

Reaffirming the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending on 15 December 1991;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 30 November 1991;

3. Calls upon all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

1/ S/22665 and Add.1 and 2.

91-19660 3470Z (E)

UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/22701
13 June 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 JUNE 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GERMANY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the transcript of a letter dated 13 June 1991 by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on the situation in the south of Iraq, addressed to the Secretary-General. I would be grateful if you could circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Detlev GRAF ZU RANTZAU
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 13 June 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany addressed to the Secretary-General

The Federal Government is following the situation in the south of Iraq with great concern. Having welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 688 Germany is dismayed by recent reports from several independent sources of brutal acts of repression against the civilian population in that area. These flagrant violations of basic human rights hold the danger of yet another mass exodus of Iraqi civilians in the near future. They certainly hamper all efforts to facilitate the return of the refugees who are still outside the county. By these activities Iraq continues to threaten international peace and stability.

You have already announced that the United Nations is prepared to establish humanitarian centres in the south of Iraq. I would like to encourage you to do so.

As you know Germany has supported programmes of UNHCR, UNICEF and other organizations for the support of Iraqi refugees. Germany is ready to provide further support, if necessary.

I am looking forward to discussing the expanding role of the United Nations during your forthcoming visit to Germany.

Hans-Dietrich GENSCHER
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 JUNE 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I should like to request that our letter of 3 June addressed to Your Excellency, of which a copy is enclosed, be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 3 June 1991 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to bring to your attention the following:

First, in spite of the provisions of paragraphs 2 (c) and 3 (c) of Security Council resolution 686 (1991), that Iraq immediately release under the auspices of the ICRC all Kuwaiti and third country nationals and arrange for immediate access to all POWs, Iraq is yet to release around 3,800 POWs and detainees of which around 700 are women and 730 are children 15 years old and below. Iraq has also been found wanting in allowing access to all POWs and detainees. Concern about their fate had been communicated to the Security Council in our letter of 20 May 1991.

Second, notwithstanding the provision of paragraph 2 (d) of resolution 686 (1991) that Iraq immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, to be completed in the shortest possible period, to date, the only item returned to Kuwait is a single aircraft that the Iraqis had kept in Jordan.

Third, while Iraq has declared, in accordance with the provision of paragraph 2 (a) of resolution 686 (1991), that it has rescinded decisions regarding the annexation of Kuwait, recent statements by the Iraqi Vice-President (S/22655) clearly contradict the aforementioned declaration. These statements emphasize that implementation of Security Council resolutions is but a tactical move rather than a change of policy by Iraq.

Lastly, it should be emphasized that failure, to date, to return all POWs and detainees, return property seized from Kuwait, and cease hostile statements are indications that the "policies and practices of the Government of Iraq" are not in implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions. What is required of Iraq is not merely acceptance, but, as described in resolution 686 (1991), implementation of its acceptance of Security Council resolutions.

I should appreciate it if you would bring this letter to the immediate attention of the members of the Security Council.

Mohammad S. AL SALLAL
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 13 JUNE 1991 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Acting on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continue to violate Iraqi airspace as indicated hereafter:

1. On 11/12 June 1991 they carried out a total of 11 sorties, 5 in formation and 1 solo sortie. The aircraft were flying at speeds of between 720 and 900 km/h and at medium altitude.

2. The aircraft's activities were concentrated over the regions of Mosul, Arbil and Zakho, their mission being one of observation and provocation.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Samir K. K. AL-NIMA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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